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PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE POST-
WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN ERA-USING A
MARKET ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE
REACH OF JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has delivered relatively few modem
decisions bearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction. I After the Court's
1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 state courts had
a fairly free rein to determine whether subjecting a defendant to jurisdic-
tion would be consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 3 Many courts and commentators favored expanding the
reach of jurisdiction to encompass an increasing number of out-of-state
defendants .4
1. The Court's personal jurisdiction cases include Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (juris-
diction based on notions of state sovereignty); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) (replaces Pennoyer power-based state sovereignty test for jurisdiction with "minimum-con-
tacts" test); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (defendant may be sued in
forum state even where cause of action arose outside the state, if defendant is doing systematic and
continuous business in the state); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (defen-
dant may be sued in forum state on the basis of a single contract with a resident of the state); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (jurisdiction may not be based on unilateral action of plaintiff or
third person; defendant must purposefully avail himself of benefits in forum state); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction requires "minimum contacts"); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (jurisdiction may not be premised on the fact that defendant
caused "effects" in the forum state); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980) (defendant must purposefully avail himself of benefits of forum state to meet "minimum
contacts" test and satisfy "federalism" restrictions on jurisdiction); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980) (defendant must establish minimum contacts to be subject to quasi in rem jurisdiction).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). This "free rein" arose
primarily because of the lack of Supreme Court decisions on jurisdiction between 1958 and 1977.
4. Several commentators have examined various means by which states should be able to acquire
jurisdiction. As many commentators generally felt that "fundamental fairness" should be the touch-
stone of jurisdiction, they often disapproved of technical restrictions on jurisdiction, although they
did not advocate removing all barriers. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 Mici. L. REv. 227 (1967); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966). The court decisions
encouraging an expansive notion of jurisdiction include McGee v. International Life Ins.Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957), in which the Supreme Court referred to the fact that modem transportation
and communication make it less inconvenient for a defendant to be sued in a distant forum; Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966) (overruled in Northern Pro-
pane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P.2d 469 (1980)), in which the court held that jurisdiction
over defendants who sent products through the stream of commerce and across state lines should not
depend on a showing that the defendant "purposefully" sought some benefit from the forum state;
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961),
which relied extensively on McGee.
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By 1980, however, the Supreme Court indicated its desire to restrict
this trend. 5 The Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson6 directed lower courts to look primarily at the defendant's inter-
ests in determining whether the defendant may be subjected to jurisdic-
tion. Under World-Wide Volkswagen, a court must first determine that the
defendant has established "minimum contacts" with the forum state:
7
only then may the court consider the interests of the resident plaintiff or
the forum state, or the interest in litigating in a convenient forum. 8 World-
Wide Volkswagen thus created a two-tiered test, with the defendant's in-
terests paramount.
This two-tiered test has created particular difficulty in product liability,
or "stream of commerce," cases: those cases in which a manufacturer's
or dealer's products9 cause damage to a plaintiff in a foreign state. The
difficulty arises when a court attempts to determine whether the manufac-
turer or dealer has established minimum contacts with the forum state. In
cases where the product was brought into the forum by a consumer, some
courts have denied jurisdiction because the contacts were created by the
"unilateral" acts of the consumer ("consumer-based contacts").' 0 On
the other hand, courts have been much more willing to exercise jurisdic-
tion where the contacts were "distributor-based," arising from the manu-
facturer's efforts to sell the product in the forum.'
This Comment proposes that courts should apply a market analysis to
all "stream of commerce" cases. The proper question in such cases is
Even after the Supreme Court's recent opinions limiting the scope of jurisdictional reach, some
commentators have favored a more expansive view. See. e.g., Braveman. Interstate Federalism and
Personal Jurisdiction. 33 SYRACUSE L. REV 533 (1982): McDougal. Judicial Jurisdiction: From a
Contacts to an Interest Analysis. 35 VAND. L. REV I (1982): Redish, Due Process. Federalism. and
Personal Jurisdiction, 75 Nw U.L. REV. 1112 (1981), in which the author criticized the federalism-
related limitations on jurisdiction articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen: Woods. Pennoyer's
Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Schaffer and Kulko and A Modest Prediction Regarding World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 20 ARiz L. REV 861 (1978). in which the author incorrectly
predicted that the Supreme Court would uphold jurisdiction in World- Wide Volkswagen.
5. The Court earlier restricted the reach of jurisdiction in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978). where it held that causing "effects" in the forum state is not sufficient.
6. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7. Id. at 291-92.
8. ld. at 294.
9. Although the stream of commerce cases usually arise in the context of product liability, the
same analysis often applies to cases in which the plaintiff seeks the services of defendant and later
returns to the forum state. In a sense, defendant's services are placed into the stream of commerce.
10. See, e.g.. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286 (1980): West Am.
Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983); Markby v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys.. 647
P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1982); Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps. 127 Ariz. 522. 622 P.2d 469 (19801.
I1. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.. 22 Ill. 2d 432. 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); see also Oswalt v. Scripto. Inc.. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980): Svendson v.
Questor Corp., 304 N.W. 2d 428 (Iowa 198 1).
Vol. 60:155, 1984
Market Analysis and Personal Jurisdiction
whether the market for the defendant manufacturer's or dealer's products
includes the forum state. If so, the defendant should be subject to jurisdic-
tion in the forum state.
The Comment begins with a look at the recent history of the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction. It then proposes a market analysis approach as an
alternative to the rigid unilateral contacts test, and discusses the market
analysis approach in the context of several recent consumer-based contact
cases. Finally, the Comment describes how courts have applied the mar-
ket analysis approach in distributor-based contact cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Early Supreme Court Cases Involving Personal Jurisdiction
The foundation case-for modem jurisdictional analysis is International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,12 in which the Court abandoned its former
power-based notion of jurisdiction in favor of an equity-based, reason-
ableness approach. 13 The key was whether a defendant had established
minimum contacts with the forum state. This new test was a deliberately
vague one; in determining whether minimum contacts existed, courts
were to decide whether subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction would of-
fend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 14 The re-
sult was that the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine permitted
courts greater jurisdictional reach. 
15
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 16 the Supreme Court
again gave impetus to an expansive view of personal jurisdiction. Al-
though adhering to the International Shoe requirement of minimum con-
tacts, the Court also noted that because of improvements in transportation
and communication, it was becoming less burdensome and inconvenient
for a defendant to litigate outside its home state. 17 Hence, only a single,
isolated contact was required for jurisdiction. 18 Moreover, the Court
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), was decided on a theory of personal jurisdiction that
required the forum state to have "power" over the defendant. Only if the defendant was present in
the state or consented to jurisdiction could jurisdiction be exercised. These limitations were designed
to protect state sovereignty. See id. at 722. International Shoe replaced this rigid theory of jurisdic-
tion with the minimum contacts test. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
14. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
15. Even before International Shoe, the Court recognized that the old Pennoyer concepts unrea-
sonably inhibited the scope of jurisdiction. For example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927),
the Court found that a nonresident motorist had, by driving on the forum state's highways, implicitly
"consented" to be sued in the forum state.
16. 355U.S. 220(1957).
17. Id. at 222-23.
18. Id. at 223.
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stressed that other factors entered into the jurisdictional balance. The
Court discussed the forum state's interest, the disadvantage that resident
plaintiffs would suffer were they required to litigate in a distant state, and
the interest in choosing a forum in which both witnesses and evidence
were present. 1 9 The decision thus permitted courts to view the minimum
contacts requirement more loosely.
Less than one year after McGee came the decision in Hanson v.
Denckla2o in which the Court emphasized that restrictions still existed on
jurisdictional reach. In Hanson, a resident of Pennsylvania executed a
trust instrument in Delaware, naming a Delaware bank as trustee but re-
serving for herself a power of appointment over the remainder of the
trust. She subsequently moved to Florida, where a suit was later brought
by legatees of the will. The legatees sued, among others, the Delaware
bank in a Florida court, claiming that they held the rights to the remainder
of the trust. 2 1 The Supreme Court overturned Florida's exercise of juris-
diction over the defendant bank.
The Court explained that it was not enough that the defendant had con-
tacts with the forum state; rather, the defendant must "purposefully
avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 22 This re-
quirement of "purposeful availment" had a logical corollary: "The uni-
lateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State." 23 After Hanson, convenience alone would not support jurisdic-
tion.
24
But Hanson did not overrule McGee, nor did it entirely contradict
McGee's general philosophical approach. 25 As a result, the Supreme
Court created a choice of precedents in jurisdictional analysis. This ambi-
guity characterized the state of jurisdictional doctrine for nearly twenty
years, as the Supreme Court decided no personal jurisdiction case from
the late 1950's to the late 1970's. 26
19. ld. at 223-24.
20. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
21. Id. at 238-43.
22. Id. at 253.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 254. The Court stated that a state "'does not acquire ... jurisdiction by being the
center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation.'"
25. The Court distineuished the facts in McGee. See id. at 251-52. McGee involved a suit
against a Texas corporation which had executed a life insurance contract with a California resident.
Suit was successfully brought in California, as the "'minimum contacts" requirement was met.
McGee, 355 U.S. at 220.
26. The first Supreme Court case decided after Hanson was Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186
(1977). During the period between 1958 and 1977, courts could cite to McGee if upholding
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B. The Problem of "Portable Torts"
The development of the minimum contacts doctrine meant that juris-
diction could encompass an increasing number of defendants. The poten-
tial for overexpansion was especially great in the stream of commerce
cases-those cases in which a dealer allegedly creates a jurisdictional
contact by providing products or services to nonresidents, who later sue
him in another forum. Dealers needed some guarantee that they would not
be subjected to "portable torts," a situation in which jurisdiction travels
with the product. 27 This problem was illustrated by a well-known hy-
pothetical in the case of Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills:
To illustrate the logical and not too improbable extension of the problem,
let us consider the hesitancy a California tire dealer might feel if asked to
sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that
he might be required to defend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit for re-
fund of the purchase price or for heavy damages in case of accident attribu-
ted to a defect in the tires.28
The Erlanger Mills court thus warned that jurisdiction should not spring
from the mere general foreseeability that a dealer's actions may cause
effects in some other state, through the movements of a consumer over
whom the dealer has no control.
29
jurisdiction, or to Hanson if denying jurisdiction. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz.
251,413 P.2d 732 (1966) (overruled in Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P.2d
469 (1980)), provides a good illustration of a court choosing the doctrine and philosophical approach
it believed most appropriate. In Phillips, the court held that the purposeful availment test of Hanson,
which limited jurisdictional reach, could not be applied literally to stream of commerce product lia-
bility cases without creating some inequitable results. 413 P.2d at 735.
27. "Travelling jurisdiction" used to be a classic problem in cases involving in rem jurisdiction.
If the "res" was a debt, then jurisdiction would be present wherever the debtor was found, as a debt
could have no situs in the abstract. The Supreme Court originally upheld travelling in rem jurisdiction
in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); but in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 186, the Court held
that in rem jurisdiction was subject to the minimum contacts rule to the same extent as in personam
jurisdiction.
28. 239 F.2d 502, 507(4th Cir. 1956).
29. This notion of general foreseeability places almost no limits on the forum state's ability to
assert jurisdiction over the defendant. This was one evil that the Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), wished to eliminate. For a discussion of
World-Wide Volkswagen, see supra Part IC. Compare the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in the
World-Wide Volkswagen case, in which the court held that an automobile "is by its very design and
purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in [the forum state]." World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court essentially allowed jurisdiction to travel with the product, albeit a special
type of product.
Washington Law Review
C. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
The language in Hanson, requiring that jurisdiction be based on a de-
fendant's purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state, seem-
ingly eliminated the danger of a defendant being haled into a state merely
because it was "generally foreseeable" that a consumer might take his
products into that state. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court faced this situa-
tion in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,30 a stream of commerce
case decided in 1980.
World-Wide Volkswagen presented a fact situation involving a poten-
tial portable tort. Plaintiffs were New York residents who bought an auto-
mobile from a New York dealer. The next year they moved to Arizona;
however, while passing through Oklahoma, the car was involved in an
accident resulting in injuries. Plaintiffs sued both the New York dealer
and the automobile distributor. 3 1 Jurisdiction hinged on the nature of the
contacts that the defendants had established with Oklahoma.
The Supreme Court first emphasized that only the defendants' contacts
could be considered, at least preliminarily. The fact that Oklahoma was
likely the most convenient forum for access to witnesses and evidence,
that Oklahoma had a significant interest in the case, and that the plaintiffs
preferred to litigate in Oklahoma, was deemed insufficient to confer juris-
diction.32
The Court found that the only contacts between the defendants and
Oklahoma were created by the "unilateral" actions of the plaintiffs. Re-
ferring to Hanson, the Court held such unilateral contacts to be insuffi-
cient for jurisdiction. 33 Otherwise, jurisdiction could be premised on the
mere general foreseeability that a consumer would take a product to any
of the fifty states. In the Court's words, "[e]very seller of chattels would
in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amena-
bility to suit would travel with the chattel."
34
The Court indicated that if the contacts with the forum state had arisen
not out of the actions of the consumer, but rather "from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for
30. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
31. Id. at 288. Plaintiffs also sued the automobile manufacturer and importer: however, these
two parties did not challenge the district court's jurisdiction. Id. n.3.
32. Id. at 294.
33. Id. at 298.
34. Id. at 296. For a discussion of general foreseeability, see supra note 29. The dissents in
World-Wide Volkswagen by both Justices Blackmun and Marshall emphasized that the unique mobil-
ity of an automobile should be considered in assessing the jurisdictional reach over a nonresident
automobile manufacturer. 444 U.S. at 314-16 (Marshall, J.. dissenting): id. at 318-19 (Blackmun.
J., dissenting). See also the lower court opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, 585 P.2d 351. 354
(Okla. 1978).
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its products in other states," such contacts would have sufficed for juris-
diction.35 Arguably, the Court was creating a bright-line test to distin-
guish cases involving consumer-based contacts from those involving dis-
tributor-based contacts.
The Court added that the forum state could assert jurisdiction over a
corporation (and presumably, any business) that "delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum state.' '36 Supposedly then, a consumer
could not create a jurisdictional contact by purchasing a product from an
out-of-state dealer and then bringing it into the forum state. This furthers
the argument that the Court was making the jurisdictional question depen-
dent on whether the contacts with the forum are consumer- or distributor-
based.
However, the Court never explicitly adopted such a test for jurisdic-
tion.37 Moreover; it muddied its opinion by stating that jurisdiction will
lie whenever a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state.' '38 If the contact* with the
forum state is an "isolated occurrence," on the other hand, jurisdiction
will not lie.39 What result if several consumers (rather than a single con-
sumer) buy products from an out-of-state dealer and bring them into the
forum state? Even though the contacts created would be consumer-based
rather than distributor-based, they, might satisfy the Court's purposeful
availment test, since they would not be isolated occurrences. Jurisdiction
might lie in this situation.
In short, while the Court has made it clear that distributor-based con-
tacts are more likely to be sufficient for jurisdiction, it has not completely
ruled out jurisdiction premised on consumer-based contacts. Lower
courts must sift through the language in World-Wide Volkswagen to deter-
mine the reach of jurisdiction in each fact situation.
35. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
36. Id. at 297-98. The Court approvingly cited Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), as an example. In Gray, the defendant shipped its
products into the forum state through distributors rather than consumers, unlike the World-Wide
Volkswagen defendant. The Court arguably drew a sharp distinction between consumer-based con-
tacts and distributor-based contacts, with only the latter sufficing for jurisdiction This Comment
argues that such an arbitrary distinction frequently leads to inequitable results.
37. Justice Marshall's dissent (joined by Justice Blackmun) does indicate a belief that the major-
ity in World-Wide Volkswagen held that jurisdiction will never be upheld where the contacts with the
forum state are consumer-based. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J. dissenting).




A. The Unilateral Contacts Doctrine and Consuner-Based Contacts
The Supreme Court first developed the doctrine of "unilateral con-
tacts" in Hanson v. Denckla,40 a case involving neither manufacturers.
consumers, nor products flowing through the stream of commerce.4 1
Only later did courts extend the language in Hanson to stream of com-
merce cases. Removed from its original context, the Hanson doctrine was
transformed into an awkward tool for restricting jurisdiction in cases of
consumer-based contacts.
In Hanson, the defendant's alleged contacts with Florida, the forum
state, arose solely because plaintiff's decedent moved from Pennsylvania
to Florida. The defendant, a Delaware bank, made no purposeful contacts
with Florida. 42 In effect, the plaintiffs were attempting to thrust jurisdic-
tion on a defendant who received no benefit at all from the forum state.
43
The Court correctly refused to exercise jurisdiction, as the only contacts
in the case stemmed from the unilateral actions of plaintiff's decedent.
44
The concepts of unilateral contacts and of purposeful availment of the
forum state, while relevant to the Hanson fact situation, are much more
difficult to apply, however, in stream of commerce cases. How does one
determine if a product's dealer has created purposeful contacts with a
forum state? Since the product's consumer may initiate the contact by
taking the product into the forum state, it may be difficult to show that the
dealer purposefully created the contact.4 5 This problem exists no matter
how many out-of-state consumers frequent the dealer's business.
40. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
41. For the facts of Hanson, see supra text accompanying note 21.
42. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958).
43. In Hanson. jurisdiction truly was -thrust'" on a defendant who had no desire to have any
contacts with the forum state. A recent case that has distinguished Hanson from World-Wide
Volkswagen is Waterval v. District Court. 620 P.2d 5. 9-10 (Colo. 1980). The subtle distinction
between attempting to "thrust" jurisdiction on a defendant (as in Hanson) and attempting to predi-
cate jurisdiction on a consumer-based contact is significant. In the Hanson-type situation, it would
clearly be inequitable for a court to uphold jurisdiction. In a case of consumer-based contacts, the
answer is not so clear. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the consumer drove the automobile from New
York to Oklahoma, a distant state. The contact created between the New York distributor and Okla-
homa, the forum state, was arguably insufficient to justify jurisdiction in Oklahoma. But in other
instances the defendant will expect and hope that the consumer will take his product into other states.
thereby expanding the defendant's product market. In this case an exercise of jurisdiction would be
equitable. The point is that jurisdiction should be denied only when plaintiff has "'thrust" contacts
with the forum state on a defendant.
44. See Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235. 253 (1958).
45. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966). the
Arizona Supreme Court discussed the difficulty of applying Hanson's requirement of purposeful
availment to cases involving consumer-based contacts. See also Woods. supra note 4. at 871-72.
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A court may simplify the problem by holding that the requirement of
purposeful contacts can never be met in this situation and that the con-
sumer's actions are per se unilateral. But this would incorrectly treat all
cases of "consumer-based" contacts as members of a monolithic class. 46
Consider, for example, a variation on the Erlanger Mills hypothetical.
Instead of a California dealer selling tires to the owner of a car with Penn-
sylvania license plates, assume that the car has Nevada license plates.
These two situations may fundamentally differ, since the dealer in the
second situation may derive a sizeable portion of its income from the
Nevada market. Yet it is difficult to differentiate the two situations by
using a purposeful contact analysis, and it is impossible to differentiate
them if consumer-based contacts are treated as unilateral per se. Another,
more flexible criterion for jurisdiction must therefore be applied in these
cases.
B. Use of a Market Analysis Approach in Cases Involving Consumer-
Based Contacts
In a companion case to World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court
noted that the critical focus in any jurisdictional analysis must be on "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 47 The
question that logically follows is: precisely what type of relationship is
necessary?
When a consumer enters another state to buy the products or services of
a dealer in that state, the consumer undoubtedly initiates the contact. Yet
this fact alone should not preclude the consumer from suing the dealer in
the consumer's home state. 48 A dealer goes into business with the expec-
tation (indeed, the hope) that many different consumers will frequent his
business. Some business locations are chosen precisely to attract
46. One commentator has urged that a sharp distinction be drawn between distributor-based and
consumer-based contacts, with the latter insufficient to support jurisdiction. See Note, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction and Products Liability: Beyond World-Wide Volkswagen, II MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 351,
378 (1981). While such a formula is workable, its application can lead to inequitable results.
47. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977)).
48. The question of who initiates the contact, and its impact on the jurisdictional issue, is more
relevant in contract cases than in product liability cases where products or services are placed in the
stream of commerce and cross state lines. In contract cases, a court may sometimes be able to deter-
mine which party sought out the other, and hold that party responsible for initiating the contact. This
would be one factor to consider in determining the jurisdictional question. For example, in Conn v.
Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), plaintiff was an Illinois mail order business that
actively solicited a Utah defendant, and later successfully sued the defendant for breach of contract in
Illinois. Since the plaintiff clearly initiated the contract, the Utah court refused to give full faith and
credit to plaintiff's Illinois judgment. In a sense, plaintiff had tried to thrust jurisdiction on the defen-
dant.
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consumers from other states. For purposes of asserting jurisdiction, the
significant factor often is not whether the dealer "purposefully" conducts
activities in another state, but rather whether the dealer receives a sizeable
benefit from the connection with the other states.
The concept of "benefit" is the core of the market analysis that courts
should apply to cases of consumer-based contacts. The market analysis
approach conforms to the notion that courts should decide jurisdictional
issues on equitable grounds, a notion that has been followed ever since
the International Shoe decision was rendered nearly forty years ago.
49
Furthermore, the market analysis approach offers sufficient safeguards to
protect a defendant dealer from unexpected claims of jurisdiction.
1. Where Jurisdiction Would Lie Under the Market Analysis Approach
There are two ways in which a dealer may establish a relationship with
another state sufficient to allow the exercise of jurisdiction by the state.
First, the dealer may actively solicit business from customers in another
state. This method of establishing jurisdictional contacts was recognized
in World-Wide Volkswagen and subsequent lower court decisions. 50 If a
dealer solicits business "either through salespersons or through advertis-
ing reasonably calculated to reach [the forum] State." 5' the size of the
profit that the dealer ultimately derives from the state should be immate-
rial. As the dealer has chosen to enter the market in another state, it is fair
to subject it to jurisdiction there. Thus, in market analysis terminology,
active solicitation plus a benefit of any size should suffice for jurisdiction.
The second situation in which jurisdiction should lie is where the dealer
derives a sizeable benefit from the market in another state, despite making
no overt effort to initiate contacts with the state. If some form of demon-
strated purposeful contact were required, there might be no basis for juris-
diction in such cases. 52 The better solution, therefore, is to find jurisdic-
tion regardless of whether one can prove that the dealer actually knew that
it was receiving a sizeable benefit. Constructive knowledge (an assump-
tion that the dealer "should have known" it was receiving this benefit
from the forum state) should be sufficient.
49. The International Shoe court emphasized that jurisdiction should be exercised only where to
do so would conform with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 326 U.S. 310.
316(1945).
50. See World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 295; West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin. Inc.. 337
N.W.2d 676, 681 (1983) (Wahl. J., concurring specially): Goff v. Armbrecht Motor Truck Sales.
Inc., 284 Pa. Super. 544, 426 A.2d 628 (1980).
51. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
52. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.. 100 Ariz. 251. 413 P.2d 732. 734-35 (Ariz.
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In order to define "sizeable benefit," both the nature and the frequency
of the dealer's contacts with the forum state must be evaluated. 53 Tradi-
tionally, courts have spoken of only two degrees of jurisdictional con-
tacts-'"isolated" or "continuous and systematic.' ' 54 The former stan-
dard is obviously easy to meet; the latter, however, has been likened to a
requirement of "pervasive presence" in the forum, and is rarely met. 55 In
cases of consumer-based contacts, an isolated contact-for example, one
customer crossing the state line to buy one product in a neighboring
forum-should not, in fairness to the dealer, suffice for jurisdiction. On
the other hand, the "continuous and systematic contacts" test would
force the consumer to show that a dealer receives a substantial benefit
from the market in the forum state. This is too great a burden.
A more realistic approach would be to create a new threshold standard,
or "middle ground," between the "isolated" and "continuous and sys-
tematic" standards. 56 This is what is meant by the requirement of a
"sizeable benefit" as a basis for jurisdiction. Use of this standard would
expand the reach of jurisdiction in cases involving consumer-based con-
tacts without leading to inequitable results. Refusal to employ such an
1966) (overruled in Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P.2d 469 (1980));
Woods, supra note 4, at 861.
53. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
54. This scheme originated in International Shoe, see id. at 317, and was elaborated in Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Courts use the two-level scheme to determine
whether jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-resident defendant, in cases where the cause of
action is unrelated to defendant's activities in the forum state. If defendant's contacts are isolated, the
cause of action must be related to those contacts for jurisdiction to lie. If defendant's contacts are
continuous and systematic, the cause of action may be wholly unrelated to those contacts.
The problem of "related" or "unrelated" contacts is not covered in this article. This Comment
deals only with those cases in which the cause of action i$ related to defendant's contacts with the
forum state. For example, if defendant is sued for selling a defective car to a nonresident from a
different forum state, the Comment considers only those instances in which defendant's contacts with
the forum involved other sales of automobiles or repairs to automobiles. It does not consider contacts
that are wholly unrelated to the cause of action.
Nonetheless, the "isolated" and "continuous and systematic" scheme still enters into play. For in
the case of consumer-based contacts, an "isolated" contact (e.g., defendant dealer sells one car to
nonresident plaintiff) has not been found to be sufficient to support jurisdiction, even though the
cause of action is related to that contact. This is because the contact is deemed "unilateral," and
hence, of no jurisdictional significance. See e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. Does
this mean that the rigorous "continuous and systematic" level of contacts must be satisfied to support
jurisdiction in cases of consumer-based contacts? This Comment argues that a middle ground, be-
tween "isolated" and "continuous and systematic," is the appropriate standard.
55. This notion of a pervasive presence requirement is discussed in Seidelson, Recasting World-
Wide Volkswagen as a Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 19 TULSA L. REv. 1, 18 (1983).
56. The idea of a middle ground is discussed in Seidelson, supra note 55, at 29. Seidelson argues
for the middle ground as a basis for jurisdiction in cases where the contacts are unrelated, though
similar, to the cause of action.
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approach, as some post-World-Wide Volkswagen decisions have demon-
strated, 57 can produce such inequities.
2. Where Jurisdiction Would Not Lie Under the Market Analysis
Approach
Where the dealer merely has knowledge of a possible jurisdictional
contact, but does not actively solicit the contact and derives only a slight
benefit from the contact, jurisdiction should not lie. This is a variation on
the World-Wide Volkswagen fact situation, in which the New York dealer
had only a vague notion of the "general foreseeability" that it was selling
an automobile to a New York resident who intended to pass through
Oklahoma en route to Arizona.
58
In a more recent case, Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps,59 the cus-
tomer, an Arizona resident, brought his mobile home to Michigan to be
serviced. The customer also specifically informed the dealer that he in-
tended to return to Arizona. Relying on language in World-Wide
Volkswagen, the customer later sued in Arizona, asserting jurisdiction be-
cause the dealer, a corporation, "deliver[ed] its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they [would] be purchased by con-
sumers in the forum state." 60 Refusing to interpret the World-Wide
Volkswagen opinion so literally, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the
customer's claim. The court declared, "We do not believe that the plain-
tiff's notice of intended use to ... [the] retailer changes the local charac-
ter of that retailer's business."61
Mere knowledge of a contact with another forum should not suffice for
jurisdiction. 62 Upholding jurisdiction on this basis would subject a dealer
to unfair hardship, since it would have only two options available. The
dealer could carry out the sale and prepare itself for a possible trip to
another forum should a lawsuit later arise, or it could simply refuse to
57. See, e.g., West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983): Markby v. St.
Anthony Hosp. Sys., 647 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1982). These cases are discussed extensively in Part IIC.
infra.
58. For the facts of World- Wide Volkswagen, see supra text accompanying note 3 1.
59. 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P.2d 469 (1980).
60. 622 P.2d at 473 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
61. Id. at 473 (quoting Granite Sales Volkswagen. Inc. v. District Court. 492 P.2d 624. 626
(Colo. 1972)).
62. The court in Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. B. Elliot Ltd.. 323 N.W.2d 683. 688 (Mich. App.
1982), pointed out that the majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen did not make clear whether
actual knowledge of a contact with the forum makes a difference in the jurisdictional analysis. The
court concluded that actual knowledge is not necessarily sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 323 N.W.2d
at 688.
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serve out-of-state customers. Forcing the dealer to choose between these
two options would be patently unreasonable.
3. Predictability of the Market Analysis Approach
The World-Wide Volkswagen opinion stressed that there must be "a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defen-
dants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.' '63 In
cases where a dealer actively solicits the market in another forum (as by
advertising in the forum), the market analysis approach provides the re-
quired predictability. The dealer in this situation will be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the forum state because it has taken the initiative to estab-
lish contacts with that state. The reach of jurisdiction is thus well within
the dealer's control.
On the other hand, where jurisdiction is based on a dealer's receipt of a
sizeable benefit from the forum state, it may be more difficult to meet the
"predictability" requirement. First, the dealer in such cases is subjected
to jurisdiction even if one cannot show that the dealer actually knew that
it was receiving a sizeable benefit from the forum. Moreover, a court and
a defendant may differ as to their interpretations of what is meant by
"sizeable benefit," since that term is difficult to quantify. With a flexible
notion of sizeable benefit, some predictability is necessarily lost.
Nevertheless, predictability is not completely eliminated. Courts may
look to such factors as (1) actual dollar revenues, (2) numbers of consum-
ers from the forum state who frequent the defendant's business, and (3)
percentages of the defendant's revenues attributable to the market in the
forum state, in determining the jurisdictional question. All of these fac-
tors are within the dealer's knowledge.
Furthermore, modem jurisdictional analysis has generally involved a
weighing of equities. Rather than look for clear-cut rules, courts have
examined the facts of each case to decide what result comports with "tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "64 While a bright-line
rule declaring all consumer-based contacts void for jurisdictional pur-
poses would be easy to apply, it would lead to inequitable results, as illus-
trated by an analysis of the following cases.
63. 444 U.S. at 297.
64. This has been true ever since International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
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C. Post-World-Wide Volkswagen Decisions Involving Consumer-
Based Contacts
Two recent cases illustrate both the inequitable results obtained under
the current approach to jurisdiction and the better results available under
the market analysis approach. In West American Insurance Company v.
Westin, Inc., 65 two residents of Minnesota drove to a Wisconsin tavern
located near the border between the two states. As they were eighteen
years old and could not legally drink in Minnesota, they wanted to take
advantage of Wisconsin's lower drinking age. On the return trip, just as
their car crossed back over the border into Minnesota, an accident oc-
curred and the two Minnesota residents sustained both personal injuries
and property damage. Their insurance company, the plaintiff in the case,
sued the Wisconsin tavern in a Minnesota court for common-law negli-
gence in making an illegal sale of alcohol. 66 The plaintiff had a strong
interest in the site of jurisdiction; not only would Minnesota be a more
convenient forum, but because of differences in the dram-shop laws of
Minnesota and Wisconsin, the plaintiff could obtain a remedy only in
Minnesota.67
The Minnesota Supreme Court held there was no jurisdiction. In doing
so, the court expressly overruled two similar cases decided prior to
World-Wide Volkswagen,68 in which jurisdiction had been premised on
three factors: (1) the foreseeability that the sale of liquor by a border city
tavern would result in an accident in Minnesota; (2) Minnesota's strong
interest in providing a forum; and (3) the insignificance of any inconveni-
ence to the defendant from litigating in Minnesota. 69 The West American
Insurance court held these factors irrelevant, since they did not point to
the defendant's contacts with Minnesota. 70 The court deemed the contacts
to be merely " unilateral" and hence insufficient to support jurisdic-
tion.7 1 The court stated that the critical relationship was "defined by de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state, not by defendant's contacts with
the residents of the forum.' 72
The result in West American Insurance seems inequitable. If residents
of a forum state patronize a defendant's business to any significant extent,
65. 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983).
66. Id. at 677.
67. Id. at 681.
68. Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070: Anderson
v. Luitjens, 247 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1976).
69. West American Insurance, 337 N.W.2d at 679.
70. Id.
71. Id.at681.
72. Id. at 679. The court cited Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). as supporting this
"rule."
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there is no reason to apply the unilateral contacts rule and deny jurisdic-
tion. The plaintiff's interest, as well as the forum state's interest, should
not be overridden by an overly restrictive characterization of the defen-
dant's contacts with the forum.
Under the market analysis approach, however, jurisdiction would lie.
It appears that no evidence was introduced at trial concerning whether the
Wisconsin tavern received a sizeable benefit from Minnesota customers,
but the court apparently could have remanded the case for discovery on
this issue.73 Most likely a sizeable benefit would have been uncovered.
74
First, the Wisconsin tavern was located fifteen miles from Minneapolis-
St. Paul, 75 a huge market. Second, the lower drinking age in Wisconsin
surely attracted many eighteen-year-old drinkers from Minnesota, and
any tavern owner would be aware of this. In fact, police officers could
have testified that, of all the drinking-and-driving accidents occurring in
the vicinity of the accident, seventy-five percent were caused by persons
drinking at the Wisconsin tavern. 76 By refusing jurisdiction, the Minne-
sota court only encouraged negligent or even illegal behavior on the part
of such defendants.
Another recent case, Markby v. St. Anthony Hospital System, 77 dealt
with unilateral contacts in a slightly different context. In Markby, liability
was not related to sale of a product, but rather to defective services ren-
dered by the defendant to the plaintiff: The defendant was a Denver, Col-
orado hospital; the plaintiff was a Wyoming resident who went to the
hospital for surgery. Due to alleged negligence on the part of hospital
employees, the plaintiff suffered a severe head injury. Though the plain-
tiff temporarily recovered and returned to Wyoming, five months later
she died because of the injury. Plaintiff's representative sued in a Wyom-
ing court for wrongful death. 78
73. West American Insurance, 337 N.W.2d at 681 (Scott, ., dissenting). The majority stated, in
a footnote, that "we must-take the limited record as it comes to us." Id. n.4. In any event, there is no
indication that the Minnesota Supreme Court would evaluate the jurisdictional question by analyzing
sizeable benefit, as recommended in this Comment.
74. In a similar case involving an Iowa border city tavern,, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
earlier upheld jurisdiction where the tavern made eight percent of its sales to Minnesota residents. Id.
at 679, referring to Anderson v. Luitjens, 247 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1976). By expressly overrul-
ing that case, in West American Insurance, the court implied that this level of contacts was insuffi-
cient. Yet eight percent is indeed a sizeable benefit, especially in this factual context. The tavern in
Anderson was surely established with the expectation that it would attract Minnesota residents. The
same reasoning applies to West American Insurance with even greater force. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 75-76.
75. See West American Insurance, 337 N.W.2d at 677.
76. Id. at 678.
77. 647 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1982).
78. Id. at 1069.
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Among the contacts the defendant hospital had with Wyoming were the
following: (1) over 300 Wyoming residents had used the Colorado hospi-
tal during the years 1980-81, and many Wyoming residents had used the
hospital prior to 1980; (2) Wyoming doctors referred patients to the hos-
pital, and the hospital had telephone conversations with those doctors
concerning the patients; (3) the defendant hospital received money from
the State of Wyoming and Blue Cross of Wyoming for services rendered-
and (4) the defendant hospital advertised in Wyoming about its air ambu-
lance service, which flew patients from Wyoming to Colorado.
79
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that no jurisdiction existed. The
court found that only the last contact mentioned-advertising an air am-
bulance service-met the requirement, developed in Hanson and restated
in World-Wide Volkswagen, that the defendant "purposefully avail [it-
self] of the privilege of acting in the forum state or of causing important
consequences in that state." 80 The court evidently determined that all the
other contacts were merely unilateral. Finding only an isolated contact,
the court concluded that jurisdiction could extend only to causes of action
having a nexus with the contact. Since the plaintiff's cause of action did
not arise from the operation of the air ambulance service, there was no
nexus, and hence no jurisdiction. 81
By dismissing the defendant's other contacts with Wyoming as insuffi-
cient for jurisdiction, the court permitted the defendant to reap sizeable
financial benefits without being subjected to out-of-state jurisdiction for
its negligent acts. 82 The court created an inflexible rule-easy to apply.
but leading to inequitable results.
Interestingly, the court in Markby noted that parts of Wyoming are
within the trade areas of out-of-state metropolitan centers (such as Denver
and Salt Lake City), that Wyoming consumers often go to businesses in
those areas to shop for goods and services, and that the entire transaction
takes place outside Wyoming. The court stated that to hold these busi-
nesses subject to jurisdiction in Wyoming would merely "encourag[e]
79. Id. at 1069-70.
80. Id. at 1073 (citing State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti. 448 P.2d 571. 574
(Or. 1968)).
81. Id. at 1074.
82. Perhaps the case could have been decided on a broader policy ground: that hospitals should
be immune from many out-of-state jurisdictional claims, since these institutions provide essential
services and should not be discouraged from treating any patient (assuming that insurance could not
alleviate this problem). Many courts have denied jurisdiction in cases involving defendant hospitals
or doctors. See. e.g., Ballard v. Fred E. Rawlins, M.D., Inc.. 101 Ill. App. 3d 601. 428 N.E.2d 532
(1981); Tarango v. Pastrana, 94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (1980). But this is a special consideration.
and does not justify a per se finding of no minimum contacts. Nonetheless, the court's opinion in
Markby appears to have broad application, even where defendant is an ordinary provider of goods
and services.
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litigation in this state which would do a disservice to the residents -of those
other states."
83
But it is precisely because consumers are within the trade areas of out-
of-state business establishments that those establishments should be sub-
jected to jurisdiction in the forum state. The problem of the portable tort,
where liability travels with the product or service rendered, simply does
not exist in these situations. As long as the "unilateral contacts" doctrine
is rigidly applied, however, businesses and corporations will continue to
be inequitably shielded from the consequences of their actions.
D. Use of the Market Analysis Approach in Cases Involving
Distributor-Based Contacts
In contrast with the inflexible unilateral contacts doctrine used in cases
like West American Insurance and Markby, many courts have employed a
flexible market analysis approach in cases involving distributor-based
contacts. 84 In such cases, a manufacturer delivers products into the
stream of commerce via distributors or middlemen operating in the forum
state. To decide whether jurisdiction should lie, courts have examined (1)
the degree of control that the manufacturer exercises over its distributors,
(2) the manufacturer's knowledge that its products will be delivered to the
forum state, (3) the benefit that the manufacturer receives from the forum
state, and (4) whether the manufacturer initiated any contacts with the
forum state by choosing to use product distributors. 85
As in the consumer-based contact cases, no precise formula can be de-
rived to determine whether a particular state is within the manufacturer's
market. Nor is such a formula desired, because the use of mechanical
formulas often produces inequitable results. It is sufficient that courts tie
the question of personal jurisdiction to an analysis of the manufacturer's
market.
1. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson and Gray v. 'American
Radiator
World-Wide Volkswagen encouraged the use of the market analysis
83. Markby, 647 P.2d at 1074.
84. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961) (jurisdiction upheld); Oswalt v. Scripto, 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction
upheld); Svendson v. Questor Corp., 304 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1981) (jurisdiction upheld); Martinez v.
American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (no jurisdiction),
affd, 60 N.Y. 2d, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367, 458 N.E.2d 826 (1983); Life Laboratories v. Valdes, 387 So.
2d 1009 (Fla. App. 1980) (no jurisdiction).
85. See cases cited supra note 84.
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approach in distributor-based contact cases. The Court contrasted the
consumer-based contacts alleged in World-Wide Volkswagen with the fact
situation in the landmark Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator.86 In
Gray, the defendant manufactured component parts for water heaters.
One of these parts was sent from Ohio to Pennsylvania and finally to Illi-
nois, via several distributors. The water heater containing the defective
part was sold to an Illinois consumer, who was injured when the heater
subsequently exploded. The Illinois Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction
over the manufacturer.
87
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen cited the Gray decision favor-
ably as an instance of "efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve
directly or indirectly, the market for its products in other states. -88 In
addition, the manufacturer "deliver[ed] its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they [would] be purchased by con-
sumers in the forum State. -89
The Illinois Supreme Court in Gray determined that the defendant re-
ceived a substantial benefit from its relationship with Illinois. 90 The court
reasoned that most manufacturers would not use product distributors to
obtain only an isolated benefit from another state, since this would not be
economical. The Illinois court thus engaged in a market analysis ap-
proach to determine jurisdiction instead of the rigid unilateral contacts
formula often used in consumer-based contact cases.
2. Recent Decisions Involving Distributor-Based Contacts
Determining the scope of a manufacturer's market for jurisdictional
purposes requires a consideration of several factors. A recent Florida de-
cision succinctly described the proper analysis. In Life Laboratories v.
Valdes, 9 1 the Florida Supreme Court dismissed a complaint that failed to
make any showing that the manufacturer "purposefully avail[ed itself] of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state."92 The Life
Laboratories opinion indicated some of the possible reasons for holding
an out-of-state manufacturer subject to jurisdiction on the basis of
86. 22111.2d432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
87. Id. at 762.
88. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
89. Id. at 297-98.
90. The Gray court held this to be a "reasonable inference." Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766. Since the
court inferred that the defendant reaped a substantial benefit from the forum state, the defendant also
necessarily reaped a sizeable benefit from the forum state (because sizeable benefit, as defined in this
Comment. is a lower threshold than substantial benefit).
91. 387 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. App. 1980).
92. Id. at 1010 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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distributor contacts. First, a manufacturer may have specific knowledge
that its product will reach a forum state. In other words, the forum state
may be one of the target areas for the manufacturer, evidencing an intent
to serve the market. Second, access to the forum state via distributor-
based contacts may provide a sizeable economic benefit for the manufac-
turer. This finding alone should be sufficient to uphold jurisdiction, on the
theory that the manufacturer had constructive knowledge of the benefit.
Third, the manufacturer may control the decisions made by the distribu-
tor. If so, then it would be fair to attribute the distributor's contacts with
the forum state to the manufacturer.
93
Three other recent cases illustrate how courts have applied the market
analysis approach in distributor-based contact cases. In Svendsen v.
Questor Corporation,94 the Iowa Supreme Court considered a fact pattern
similar to that in Gray. The defendant was a manufacturer of pool tables
with its principal place of business in Missouri. One of the pool tables
was sent to a Nebraska distributor, who in turn sold it to an Iowa bowling
center. The pool table collapsed and injured the plaintiff's foot. The
plaintiff sued in an Iowa court, and the jurisdictional question concerned
the extent and nature of the defendant's contacts with Iowa. 95
To answer this question, the Svendsen court considered whether the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of the Iowa market. Even
though the record mentioned only one contact, the manufacturer did not
claim that the use of its pool table in Iowa was an isolated instance. 96 In
addition, the court noted the geographical proximity of both the manufac-
turer and the distributor to Iowa, the forum state. Given these facts, the
court concluded that "it is reasonable to infer that their commercial trans-
actions resulted in more than insubstantial use and consumption in the
state.', 97 Thus the exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
Martinez v. American Standard9 8 indicates how courts can use the mar-
ket analysis approach to deny jurisdiction in distributor-based contact
cases. In Martinez, a man was injured when an air conditioner malfunc-
tioned in a New York hotel. The man sued the manufacturer, which in
turn filed a third-party indemnification action against the component man-
ufacturer of the terminal pins for the air conditioner. The component
manufacturer was a Rhode Island corporation, and the question was
93. Seeid. at 1011.
94. 304 N.W.2d428 (Iowa 1981).
95. Id. at 429-31.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.




whether the component manufacturer had established sufficient contacts
with New York. 99
The New York appellate court found no such contacts. The court first
noted that the component manufacturer had no control over the distribu-
tor. Furthermore, aside from the single contact represented by the defec-
tive air conditioner, the evidence showed only that the component manu-
facturer shipped its products to a distributor "in the midwest" and
received "substantial revenue from interstate commerce." The evidence
showed no intent specifically to serve New York; nor could the court con-
clude that the component manufacturer should have known that its prod-
ucts would go to New York, aside from the general knowledge that its
products conceivably could end up anywhere in the country. Finally, the
court implicitly concluded that the single contact with New York. cou-
pled with the general evidence of "substantial revenue from interstate
commerce," did not indicate that the component manufacturer received a
sizeable benefit from New York. After weighing these factors, the court
decided that it lacked jurisdiction. 100
Svendsen and Martinez both involved domestic manufacturers. The
market analysis approach to determine jurisdiction has also been applied
to cases involving foreign manufacturers. One such case is Oswalt v.
Scripto. 10 1 In that case Tokai-Seiki, a Japanese manufacturer of cigarette
lighters, sold its products to Scripto, its exclusive United States distribu-
tor. A customer bought a lighter in a Texas retail store; the lighter later
malfunctioned, causing injury. There was no question that Tokai-Seiki
was serving the United States market in a general sense. The question was
whether the manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of the benefits of
the Texas market. 1
02
The Oswalt court did not construe the term "purposeful availment" in
an overly rigid way. It focused on the manufacturer's control over the
distribution system. Although the record showed that only twelve to fif-
teen lighters had positively appeared in Texas, Tokai-Seiki had distribu-
ted three to four million overall, to "many [unnamed] states of the United
States." 10 3 So, while the manufacturer did not precisely determine the
number of lighters allocated to each state, its "distribution system was
not structured to gain some 'minimum' assurance . . . that the lighters
would not be sold in Texas." 1
04
99. 457 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
100. Id. at 98-99.
101. 616 F.2d 191 (5thCir. 1980).
102. Id. at 196-98.
103. Id. at 197-98.
104. Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
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The court also implied that Tokai-Seiki derived a sizeable benefit from
sales in Texas. The court found that the manufacturer should have known
that its products would reach Texas.105 In effect, the court charged the
manufacturer with constructive knowledge of this fact. The court could
not have taken this stance without assuming that substantially more than
twelve to fifteen lighters had entered the Texas market. Hence, the court
implicitly concluded that the manufacturer received a sizeable benefit
from the Texas market. Cases like Svendsen, Martinez, and Oswalt dem-
onstrate that courts have been willing to sift and analyze various market
factors--control, intent to serve the market, and resulting benefit-in de-
termining whether to subject manufacturers to jurisdiction because of
their distributor-based contacts. Properly applied, such an approach leads
to equitable results. The same approach should also be used in cases in-
volving consumer-based contacts.
III. CONCLUSION
A market analysis approach to jurisdiction can be applied within the
framework of the two-tiered World-Wide Volkswagen test, which requires
a court to determine that the defendant's contacts with the forum state are
sufficient before it may consider such factors as the plaintiff's interests,
the interests of the forum state, and the interest in overall convenience.
Certainly the defendant's interests can be adequately protected without
requiring jurisdiction over the defendant to hinge on a literal showing of
purposeful contacts with the forum state. In addition, the market analysis
approach allows the second tier of factors in the World-Wide Volkswagen
test to retain some vitality. Where the contacts between the defendant and
the forum are consumer-based, these second tier factors may well tip the
overall balance in favor of jurisdiction. But if courts simply characterize
consumer-based contacts as unilateral and hence, insufficient for jurisdic-
tion, the second-tier factors never come into play. Rigid application of the
purposeful contacts test produces inequitable results and is inappropriate
105. Id. at 200. The court in Oswalt made it clear that actual knowledge on the part of the manu-
facturer need not be proven. Citing dictum from World-Wide Volkswagen, it noted that Tokai-Seiki
had "delivered its product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum state." Oswalt, 616 F.2d at 200 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). "The instant case fits like a glove the commercial context and
the manufacturer's distribution plan for the marketing of its product contemplated by the World-Wide
Volkswagen dictum." Oswalt, 616 F.2d at 200.
The court also ruled that "sufficient other contacts" need not be conclusively proven as a prerequi-
site to exercising jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Id. at 201. The court was willing to make a
"reasonable inference" that other jurisdictional contacts (i.e., other sales of lighters to Texas con-
sumers) in fact existed, using the approach of Gray v. American Radiator. Id. at 201-02.
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in stream of commerce cases. The market analysis approach represents a
better solution to the problem of jurisdiction in such cases.
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